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RECENT CASES
ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-FEDERAL

SECURITIES EXCHANGE

STOCK PURCHASES BY INSIDERS POSSESSING MATERIAL INFORMATION AND MISLEADING CORPORATE PRESS RELEASE VIOLATE SEC RULE 10b-5

The Texas Gulf Sulphur Company (hereafter TGS) had been conducting
exploratory surveys for mineral deposits in eastern Canada since 1957. On
November 12, 1963 visual estimates of an initial drilling on land located near
Timmins, Ontario revealed the presence of copper, zinc, and silver. Although
the actual value of these deposits was not established to be between 150 and
250 million dollars until several months later, the company's expert witnesses
testified that at the time they had never seen or heard of a comparable initial
drill hole. After learning of the drilling results, the president of TGS ordered
both the drilling site to be concealed and the exploration group to keep the
results confidential in order to facilitate the acquisition of surrounding land, a
procedure which the trial court found to be the usual mining practice under the
circumstances.
During the period from November 12, 1963 until April 16, 1964 when the
results of subsequent operations at Timmins were made known to the public,
seven of the defendants who had knowledge of the drillings or of the accompanying land acquisition program purchased TGS stock and calls (options to buy
stock at a fixed price at or within a certain time) on the national securities
exchanges, without disclosing their knowledge to the public or to the persons
from whom they purchased. Among these individuals, some of whom had never
purchased TGS stock or calls before, were directors and officers of TGS as well
as employees without managerial status in the company. One such employee, a
geologist, was said to have recommended TGS stock to friends who as "tippees"
then proceeded to purchase shares for themselves during the same period. Moreover, in February, 1964 five of the defendants accepted stock options from the
company without disclosing their knowledge of the Timmins discovery to the
Stock Option Committee of the Board of Directors.
By Friday, April 10, 1964, the results of a fourth drill hole had established
a third dimension to the mineralized zone, thus giving TGS geologists some
idea of the extent of the deposit. Shortly after these findings were communicated
to TGS offices in New York, the executive vice president drafted a press release designed to quell rumors about the discovery which had appeared in the
New York press. The press release which appeared in New York newspapers on
Monday, April 12, stated that unauthorized reports had exaggerated the scale
of operations, characterized the findings as "prospects," and indicated that
further study would be required before the results would be conclusive. The
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release promised that more definite statements would be issued to TGS stockholders and the public. No significant activities in TGS shares resulted from
the issuance of the statement.
Meanwhile, an article reporting a 10 million ton ore strike was approved
for publication in a Canadian mining journal on April 16. A similar statement
was given to the Ontario Minister of Mines for release on the 15th. The statement was not distributed in Canada, however, until the morning of April 16
shortly before a detailed report of a 25 million ton discovery was released to
the American press at 10 A.M. During this latter period the secretary of TGS
ordered further purchases of TGS stock. On the 16th a director left the press
conference before it had ended and called his son-in-law, a stockbroker, who
then purchased shares for the family trust and his customers before the news
appeared over the Dow Jones broad tape at 10:54 A.M. That day TGS stock
closed at 363s in comparison to 29y/s on the previous day. One month later, it
sold at 58%.

Shortly thereafter the Securities and Exchange Commission began disciplinary proceedings in a federal district court against the individual defendants
and TGS alleging violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of

1934, and rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, as grounds for injunctive relief
to:

(1) Restrain the individual defendants from (a) making further purchases
of TGS stock without disclosing material information which had not

been made available to the public, and (b) from disclosing such information to other persons not associated with TGS so that they might
act on it;
(2) Compel the individual defendants to offer recission to those persons
from whom they had purchased shares;
(3) Compel the individual defendants to make restitution to those persons
who had sold shares to outsiders with information which had been
disclosed to them by the defendants; and
(4) Restrain the corporate defendant from issuing any further materially
false and misleading press releases to the public.'
Judge Bonsai of the Southern District of NeNV York dismissed the complaint
against TGS and ten of the twelve individual defendants who appeared. Relying
on expert testimony that "one drill core does not establish an ore body, much
less a mine," the Court found that purchases of TGS stock prior to April 9, 1964
were not violative of section 10(b) since drilling results did not consitute material information until that time. Only the two defendants who had purchased
stock between the 9th and the morning of the 16th were adjudged to have
1. Complaint, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, complaint filed, Civil Action No. 65-1182,
S.D.N.Y., April 19, 1965, as summarized by Kennedy and Wander, Texas Gulf Sulphur, A

Most Unusual Case, 20 Bus. L. 1057, 1060 (1965).

582
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violated the Act. The issuance of the press release during this latter period,
however, was held not to be unlawful because there had been no showing that
the corporation or the individual defendants had sought to benefit from the
release and because the statement was not shown to be "misleading or deceptive
on the basis of the facts then known" to the drafters?2 On appeal by the SEC
and the two defendants who were held to have violated the Act, the parties
stipulated to defer the question of remedies to be applied pending a final determination of liability.3 SEC v. Texas Gulf Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
An important part of the Securities and Exchange Commission's role as
federal watchdog over the national exchanges is the prevention of fraudulent
acts and practices. In addition to the specific prohibition of misrepresentation
and deception in connection with the use of a prospectus or registration statement 4 and the broad proscription of fraudulent offers and sales of securities in
interstate commerce, 5 one of the more flexible administrative weapons available
to the SEC is Rule 10b-5 promulgated pursuant to the Commission's rulemaking
power under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 7 Borrowing
from the language of the general fraud provisions in section 17 of the 1933 Act,
the rule provides that it shall be unlawful for any person8 to employ manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
by means of the mails, interstate commerce, or the facilities of the national
securities exchanges. Specifically proscribed are (1) the employment of devices,
schemes, or artifices to defraud, (2) the misrepresentation of material facts
or the omission of material facts which make statements misleading, or (3) the
engaging in practices which operate, or which would operate, as a fraud or
deceit on any person.
The Commission's purpose in promulgating the rule in 1942 appears to
have been to close a serious "loophole" in the protections against fraud under
the 1933 and 1934 Acts.9 Prior to that time neither the statutes nor the
Commission's rules proscribing fraud covered the purchase of securities by
persons other than brokers and dealers in the over-the-counter markets.' 0
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act applied only to fraudulent sales."1 Section 15(c)
of the 1934 Act applied to purchases and sales by brokers and dealers but only
2. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 401

F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), petition for cert. filed sub. nom. Coates v. SEC, 37 U.S.L.W. 3250
(U.S. Jan. 3, 1969) (No. 897).
3. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 839 n.1 (2d Cir. 1968).

4. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11 and 12, 48 Stat. 82, 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.

§§ 77 and 771 (1964).

5. Id. § 17, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
7. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78d
(1964).
8. "Person" includes a corporation, partnership, trust, etc. Id. § 3(a) (9), 48 Stat.
882 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (9) (1964).
9. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.3230. (May 21, 1942).
10. 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1424-1428 (2d ed. 1961).
11. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84, as enacted, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964).
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in the over-the-counter market. 12 Consequently, one of the more common
situations, in which officers, directors, principal shareholders, or the corporate
issuer itself purchased securities on the exchanges without disclosing inside
information relevant to the true value of the securities traded, did not in itself
give rise to liability under the federal acts.' 3 Furthermore, while the defrauded
buyer was afforded a civil remedy in connection with transactions effected by
the misrepresentations and omissions of the seller,' 4 a person who sold securities on the market in transactions which did not involve misleading or defective registration statements and prospectuses, or explicitly prohibited market
manipulations, was compelled to turn to state law for relief since the federal
acts failed to provide him with a remedy.
In most state courts, however, recovery against corporate insiders was
impeded by the limited scope of liability for common law misrepresentation.
In accordance with the idea that there could be no tortious liability for nonfeasance, officers and directors who dealt in their corporation's securities were
responsible only for having made outright misrepresentations and half truths
or for having actively concealed material facts. By the majority view, insiders
were not liable for nondisclosure of facts absent some fiduciary relationship
involving an affirmative duty of disclosure.' 5 The theory that mere silence
should not generally constitute a breach of duty persisted in transactions on
the stock exchanges where nondisclosure is the usual practice., Prior to the
enactment of the federal securities legislation, however, federal courts attempted to mitigate the common law rule by finding some special duty to
speak. The Supreme Court conceded that although the ordinary relations between a director and shareholder do not create a duty of disclosure as to the
value of shares before the director's purchase from the shareholder, "yet there
12.

§ 78(o)

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(c) (1), 48 Stat. 895, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
(e)(1) (1964).

13. Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, however, provides that directors, officers, and the
owners of more than 10 per cent of any class of stock shall be liable to the corporate issuer
for profits realized from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of their corporation's securities within any period of less than six months. Securities Exchange Act § 16(b),
48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
14. The 1933 Act provides for the civil liability of the seller in connection with the
offer or sale of a security accomplished by means of a misleading prospectus or oral
communication. Securities Act § 12(2), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)
(1964). Other express provisions for civil remedies include: Securities Act § 11, 48 Stat. 82
(1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964) (issuer liable for misleading registration statement) ; Securities Act § 12(1), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964) (seller
liable for defective registration or prospectus under section 5 of the 1933 Act); Securities
Exchange Act § 9(e), 48 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(i)(e) (1964) (any person liable
to sellers and purchasers for willful manipulation of security prices); Securities Exchange
Act § 18, 48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964) (any person liable for
misleading statements filed under the Exchange Act to purchasers and sellers who relied
thereon). See 3 Loss, supra note 10, at 1682-1763.
15. Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 584 (1861) (officers and directors were held to
have an affirmative duty of disclosure to the corporation and to stockholders in dealings
undertaken on behalf of the corporation). Cf. Prosser, Law of Torts § 101 (3d ed. 1964)
and Restatement of Torts § 551 (1938).
16. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933).

RECENT CASES
are cases where, by reason of the special facts [unknown to the seller], such
a duty exists."' 7 The injured party, however, still faced the problem of ascertaining which circumstances constituted "special facts."
Shortly after the promulgation of Rule 10b-5 the Commission indicated
that the failure of a corporation and its insiders to disclose information surrounding the actual state of corporate earnings and a plan to liquidate the
corporation was violative of the Rule and that rescission of their purchases
ought to be made to the seller.' 8 Realizing the inadequacy of administrative
and criminal sanctions, federal courts quickly recognized that the ". . . existence of a remedy is implicit under general principles of the law."' 9 The success of suits brought under Rule 10b-5 in situations where on substantially the
same facts the seller failed to recover on a theory of common law deceit 2° indicated that the federal rule would raise fewer obstacles than had the common
law with regard to the requirement of materiality, scienter, reliance, and
proof of actual damage. 2 '
Although critics point to an unwarranted disregard of congressional and
administrative intent by the courts,2 2 much of the judicial discussion concerns
the extent to which the rule incorporates the elements of common law fraud.
Although no language touching on scienter, reliance, or causation is included
in the statute, section 10(b) has been construed to require at least some
showing of a "proper relationship" among the minimum elements necessary
for a cause of action under the rule, namely the use of the mails or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, a purchase or sale of a security, and the
use of a manipulative or deceptive device.as
Early decisions spoke of a duty of insiders to disclose facts "...
coming
to their knowledge by reason of their position, which would materially affect
the judgment of the other party to the transaction.12 4 Couched in these terms,
17.

Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909).

18. Ward LaFrance Truck Corp., 13 SEC 373 (1943).
19. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1947), modified,
83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). See Restatement of Torts § 286 (1934) (a civil cause
of action arises under a violation of statute where plaintiff is within the class of persons
whom the statute was intended to protect and the interest invaded was one which the
statute was intended to protect.).
20. In Speed v. Transamerica Corp. a minority shareholder recovered from a controlling shareholder who had purchased shares at less than true value without disclosing any
material facts. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), modified
on other grounds, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956). But see Geller v. Transamerica Corp. where
under Kentucky law an officer or director was held to be under no obligation to volunteer
information. 53 F. Supp. 625, 630 (D. Del. 1943), aff'd per curiam, 151 F.2d 534 (3d Cir.

1945).
21. Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
22. See, e.g., H. Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 473, 476 (1967); and D. Ruder, Corporate Disclosures Required by the Federal
Securities Laws: The Codification Implications of Texas Gulf Sulphur, 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 872

(1967).
23. Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711, 713 (8th Cir. 1963).
24. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the requirement of materiality would seem to be closely associated with the
actual, subjective state of the seller's mind and the concept of reliance in
common law misrepresentation. Later cases, however, differentiate between
the two concepts. Materiality has come to mean that a duty of disclosure will
arise only where there exist those significant facts ". . . about a corporation's
business which in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the
value of the corporation's stock or securities and which the insiders should
reasonably believe are unknown to the outsider." 25 This standard coincides with
the position that materiality requires that a reasonable man would attach
importance to the fact misrepresented while reliance requires that the plaintiff
himself have attached importance to the same fact. 20 Consequently, no liability
under Rule 10b-5 attaches to transactions where the undisclosed information
has only possible rather than probable market consequences, 27 or where the
only to the insider is too remote
possibility of some corporate action known
28
investor
reasonable
a
influenced
to have
The materiality-reliance dichotomy is significant in situations where there
has been no misstatement of fact made and actual reliance becomes a difficult
matter of proof since plaintiff knows only of the insider's silence. In cases of
the complete nondisclosure of facts relevant to the value of securities traded,
liability need not be based on implied representation. In face-to-face transactions not executed on the exchanges, liability has been said to rest on a
disjunctive construction of the rule insofar as under the third clause of the
rule alone the insider's silence constitutes an "act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit" on the plaintiff.2 9
The affirmative duty to speak arises from the statutory attempt to equalize
the bargaining position between the insider and all other investors.80
Moreover, proof of the plaintiff's reliance alone may not be a true indication that the insider's conduct was the proximate cause of his injury where
factors other than the defendant's conduct may have influenced the course
of market prices when plaintiff traded in the market.31 Nevertheless, a violation
of a federal securities statute does not give rise to a private remedy absent some
2
causal relationship between the alleged violation and the injury claimed. In
common law deceit, reliance is the concept used to establish this causal connec25. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963).
26. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965). See Restatement of
Torts § 538 (1934).
27. James Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n v. Gulf Mobile and Ohio R.R. Co., 264
F.2d 445, 450 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959).
28. List v. Fashion Park, 340 F.2d 457, 464 (2d cir. 1964).
29. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951); Cochran v.
Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
30. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951).
31. See W. Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of
Federal Corporation Law Under Rde 10b-5, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1361, 1369 (1965); and
Note; Civil Liability Under Section lOB and Rule 1oB-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the
Doctrine of Privity, 74 Yale L.J. 658, 674 (1965).
32. Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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tion insofar as the injured party's "justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentations is a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which results
in his loss." 3 3 In the case of nondisclosure, although a plaintiff need not prove
that he actively relied on the defendant's silence, "the proper test is whether the
plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than he did if the defen34
dant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact."
Assuming that the injured seller has relied upon conduct violative of 10b-5,
there remains the question as to the extent he should recover against the insider-purchaser whose presence in the market was unknown to him and whose
purchases did not involve any of the shares sold by the injured party. Conceivably, this particular seller has relied on the insider's conduct as much as
the seller whose shares actually found their way into the insider's hands. To
limit the class of potential plaintiffs to those persons whose shares were actually
transferred to insiders, an early decision required that there be at least "a
semblance of privity between the vendor and purchaser."3 5 Later cases, however, made it clear that the absence of privity of contract is not fatal to the
plaintiff's case. Instead, courts have restricted the scope of the insider's duty
in terms of reliance. Where a partial disclosure of material facts has been made,
a purchaser-plaintiff, for example, need only allege that ".. . he has purchased
the shares from whatever source, relying upon the misleading statements, and
that through such purchase has suffered damage." 36 Indeed, the erosion of
privity under l0b-5 has progressed to a point such that only the plaintiff need
have engaged in a purchase or sale. Recovery is fully possible against nontrading third parties whose unlawful conduct has caused the injured party to
37
buy or sell.
That the plaintiff must be at least a buyer or seller in an action for
damages seems to be the general rule despite continuing attempts to broaden
the scope of section 10(b) to include liability for the fraudulent management of
corporate affairs as well as liability for fraudulent practices associated with the
purchase or sale of securities. 38 Plaintiff need not be a seller in actions for injunctive relief on the grounds that such suits largely avoid the issues of proof
of loss and causation which are present in claims for damages 9 A recent opinion 40 which has been cited in the Second Circuit as the basis for permitting a
33. Restatement of Torts § 546 (1938). See Prosser supra note 15 at § 103.
34. See List v. Fashion Park 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1964).
35. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio and Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
36. Freed v. Szabo Food Service, Inc. 8 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1191,317 (N-D. Ill.
1964).
37. Miller v. Bargain City, U.SA., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1964); New
Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
38. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952).
39. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967).
40. Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627, 636 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 970 (1967).
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non-trading plaintiff to maintain an action for damages 4 ' expressly left the
question open by refusing to pass on the Commission's argument that plaintiff
need only establish that the rule has been violated and that his stock lost value
as a result in order to recover.
Although facts amounting to deception must be alleged to make out a
prima facie case, the deception need not be restricted in any common law
sense. 42 The absence of any language in the rule requiring intentional conduct,
and broad readings of the rule in the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have
indicated that proof of scienter or "... knowledge of the falsity or misleading
character of a statement and a bad faith intent to mislead or misrepresent are
not required to prove violation of the statute upon which a civil remedy for
damages will lie."4 3 On the other hand, problems of scienter do arise in actions
by defrauded purchasers under section 10(b) where unlike sections 11 and 12
of the 1933 Act, nothing in the way of procedural requirements is set forth.
Section 12, which expressly provides for actions by defrauded buyers, requires
that the plaintiff-buyer sustain the burden of proof that the seller did not reasonably believe his statements to be true.44 For this reason the Second and Ninth
Circuits, for example, require that the buyer make an averment of scienter in
his complaint under section 10(b) lest the buyer's action under that section
nullify the limitation made applicable by Congress to section W 5
Unlike all private actions, however, administrative and judicial proceedings brought by the SEC under section 2140 of the 1934 Act are not hindered
by the absence of proof of actual injury to investors 47 where "the aim of administrative proceedings under Rule 10b-5 is to deter misconduct by insiders,
rather than to compensate their victims." ' 48 Nor is the SEC limited to obtaining
the injunctive relief for defrauded investors which is specifically authorized by
statute. Under their broad equitable powers the federal courts may "order an
accounting and restitution ... and provide such other equitable relief as might be
necessary to protect the public interest and effectuate the statutory purpose." 4
Accordingly, the Commission has sought to extend the scope of liability
41. Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.I).N.Y. 1967) (citing Vine, id.) But see
Greenstein v. Paul, 275 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
42. O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964).
43. Kohler v. Kohler Co. 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963); see also Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961), aff'd on other grounds, 328 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1964);
Texas Continental Life Insurance Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., Inc., 187 F. Supp. 14, 23 (W.D.
Ky. 1960), rev'd to decide issue of fact sub nom. Texas Continental Life Insurance Co. v.
Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962).
44. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771
(1964).
45. Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Trussel v. United
Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 771 (D. Col. 1964).
46. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 48 Stat. 899 (1934), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 78u (1964).
47. Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 1963).
48. See List v. Fashion Park 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1964).
49. SEC v. Wong, 1964-1966 transfer binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f1 91,669 at
95,456 (D.P.R.) (1966).
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under the rule to reach conduct which is not technically sufficient to sustain a
common law action for fraud and deceit. Foreshadowing many of the issues in
the instant case the Commission itself has made it clear that silence on the
part of any person who trades on the exchange does not preclude liability under
the rule regardless of whether or not he is a traditional insider within the
meaning of section 16(b) of the 1934 Act.50 Rather, the duty of disclosure has
been held to rest upon "the existence of a relationship giving access . . . to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose . . . and

the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such in51
formation knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing."
Relying on this rationale, the Court of Appeals in the instant case reversed
the dismissal of the complaint against eight of the eleven individual defendants
who knew of the facts surrounding the initial operations at Timmins. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment against the two defendants who traded after
April 9, 1964 was affirmed. Only one of the defendants who had traded prior to
the issuance of the official announcement on April 16 was held not to have purchased his stock on the basis of material inside information surrounding the work
at Timmins. The fact that certain defendants were not traditional insiders was of
no consequence where these persons were in possession of material inside information which must be disclosed to the investing public before these individuals
could trade in the securities of their employer. Their duty to refrain from disclosure by reason of corporate secrecy surrounding the discovery did not justify
their silence where the defendants could have stayed out of the market until the
52
corporation itself had revealed the strike to the public.

Although the possesser of inside information is not always precluded from
trading on the basis of his special knowledge, market activity without disclosure
is forbidden in those extraordinary situations "which are reasonably certain to
have a substantial effect on the market price of the security" 53 if the basic facts
surrounding the situation are disclosed. The materiality of the information is
not diminished by the fact that only the speculative invester would rely on it.
Rejecting the trial court's test of whether a conservative trader would have used
the defendants' knowledge, Judge Waterman, writing for the Court, concluded
that the results of the first drilling were not so remote as to be immaterial if
the knowledge of the possibility of the existence of a mine was a fact to which
54
a reasonable, if speculative, investor would have attached importance.
50. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b).
51. Cady, Roberts and Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961). See Ross v. Licht where the
court, pointing to a "relationship giving access," indicated that tippees (outsiders who trade
in reliance on information provided them by insiders) violate the rule although the relationship among the defendants is such that liability in any event could be predicated on the
aiding and abetting of a violation, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
52. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
53. Id. 850. According to Judge Waterman, the insider must balance "both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in
the light of the totality of the company activity," id. at 849.
54. Id. 850.
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Consequently, all who traded on the basis of the initial drilling results
before April 17, 1964 were held to have engaged in a deceptive practice in
violation of section 10(b) and its rule. Likewise, those defendants who disclosed their material knowledge to outsiders in order that they might also trade
had violated section 10(b) by their "tipping."5 5 Nor was the surrender of stock
options by those who had accepted them without disclosing their knowledge of
the Timmins discovery a satisfaction of the Commission's claim for their recision where the surrender was made only after proceedings had been commenced
against the defendants, and the issuance of injunctions might be necessary to
prevent future violations of the rule in this manner. 60
As for the defendants who had traded just before and after the official
announcement of April 16, liability could not be avoided on the grounds that
the news had already been effectively disclosed in the Canadian news media or
by the mere issuance of a statement to the American press.5 7 Nor did the honest
belief of those particular defendants that sufficient disclosure had been made
prior to placing their orders preclude liability. An insider's good faith is no
defense to an action for equitable relief under 10b-5 since a liberal interpretation
of the regulatory provisions indicates that negligent conduct is unlawful. In
8
accordance with previous decisions in the Second Circuit, however, the Court
was careful to point out that its holding was consistent with the requirement
that some form of scienter ". . . whether it be termed lack of diligence, con9
structive fraud, or negligent conduct, remains implicit .. ." in the rule. Freedom from liability at least requires that the defendants' belief be reasonable
under the circumstances. 60
And, in view of the fact that one of the more significant purposes of the
federal securities legislation was the prevention of the circulation of improper
information by the issuer itself," the company could not be held to a less
rigorous standard of care in the issuance of the press release on April 12, 1964.02
Rejecting the trial court's reasoning that no cause of action against TGS had
55. Id. 852.
56. Since the SEC did not appeal the dismissal of the complaint against two defendants

whom the trial court held not to be part of "top management" and thus without a duty

of disclosure to the Stock Option Committee, the Court of Appeals made no finding as to
the scope of liability in regard to the acceptance of the options; id. at 857; see also supra
note 24.
57. Adequate disclosure to the investing public, said the majority, meant that the
defendants should have at least awaited the announcement's appearance over the "media of
widest circulation, the Dow Jones broad tape . . . ." Id. 854.
58. See discussion accompanying supra note 45. The Court also relies on its discussion
of sections 11 and 17 of the 1933 Act in Barnes v. Osafsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967).
59. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968).
60. Id. 856.
61. Id. 858-59. See also Judge Friendy's concurring opinion at 868.
62. With respect to the press release Judge Waterman wrote: "Accordingly, we hold
that Rule 10b-5 is violated whenever assertions are made, as here, in a manner reasonably
calculated to influence the investing public, e.g. by means of the financial media, . . . if
such assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to mislead irrespective of
whether the issuance of the release was motivated by corporate officials for ulterior purposes,"
id. at 862.

RECENT CASES
been established since the press release had not been given out "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security," Judge Waterman pointed out that,
unlike other sections of the securities acts, no language within section 10(b)
specifically required the defendant's participation as a condition to liability. In
Waterman's view, legislative history indicates that the section was intended as
a catchall clause to enable the SEC to deal with new forms of manipulative
devices.6 4
That the corporation's liability should not turn on the existence of the
specific intent to derive a direct benefit is evidenced by the Court's statement
that ". . the investing public may be injured as much by one's misleading
statement... caused by negligence as by a misleading statement published intentionally to further a wrongful purpose." 65 As in the case of the insider conduct discussed above, however, the corporation's due diligence in seeking out
the whole truth and disseminating the same in good faith would preclude liability
66
even though the statement is found to be materially false or misleading.
Accordingly, the finding of the trial court that the press release was not
misleading on the basis of facts known to its drafters at the time it was issued
was not sufficient where the proper test was "whether the reasonable investor, in
the exercise of due care, Would have been misled by it."167 Nor was the finding
that the drafters had used "reasonable business judgment under the circumstances" satisfactory where the trial court ought to have determined whether
the drafters had exercised due diligence. 68 Without having to decide whether
the lack of due diligence alone, absent proof of bad faith, would sustain an
action for damages against the corporation, the Court reversed the dismissal of
the complaint against the company and remanded to the district court. The
district court was instructed to determine whether the press release was in fact
misleading to a reasonable investor and whether the statement was issued by
reason of the corporation's failure to use due diligence under the circumstances.
If both issues were resolved affirmatively, the district court might then, in its
discretion, enjoin the company from distributing further deceptive information
to the public.69
The instant case seems to have judicially established on firm ground the
holding of Cady, Roberts"0 that an insider's silence in connection with purchases
on the securities exchanges can be as damning as the utterance of outright falsehoods and half-truths. The majority opinion lays to rest speculation that the
63. See, e.g., sections 12(2) and 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act, and section 15(c) (1)
of the 1934 Securities Act.
64. Id. at 859 citing the testimony of proponents of section 10(b). Hearings Bejore
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934).

65. Id. 860.
66. Id. 862.
67. Id. 863.
68. Id.

69. Id.
70.

Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961).
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rule of Cady, Roberts could be explained away as a special duty to which only
brokers and dealers were subject. Consequently, the holding of Goodwin v.
Agassiz 71 a classic common law case in the area which bears a remarkable
similarity to the factual situation in the instant case, appears to have been rejected by the Court as no longer applicable to the commercial world. Rather,
the conclusion seems to be that the reluctance on the part of some individuals to
seek corporate office because of the unavailability of insider profits is not too
high a price to pay for the integrity of the market.7 2 Admittedly, the ordinary
investor's knowledge and judgment is unlikely to be equal to that of the corporate official who is trading in his company's securities. Yet, the requirement of
full disclosure seems appropriate where the trader has access to information
which he should reasonably know would substantially distort the market risks
of other investors. Because so many legitimate fringe benefits are available to
corporate employees in the form of stock option programs, retirement plans,
etc., the imposition of liability for the misuse of corporate information seems
just and proper.
If mere silence can be unlawful, however, trial courts in the future will be
faced with the difficult problem of determining which facts ought to have been
disclosed. It was the factual problem of ascertaining when a reasonable investor
could have believed that the Timmins discovery was more than just a "prospect"
which most disturbed the dissenting judges. Likewise, the majority of the Court,
with the exception of Judges Friendly and Kaufman, seemed reluctant to deal
with the question of whether the corporate press release of April 12 was in
fact misleading to a reasonable investor. Indeed, the majority's reversal of the
district court's holding was greatly facilitated by the trial court's attempt to
limit the insider's duty to reasonable, but conservative traders. If the district
court had refrained from elaborating on the rule of law which had been set fourth
in List v. FashionPark,73 the majority undoubtedly would have found their job
more difficult when compelled to deal with factual considerations alone. Consequently, it can be fairly said that the instant case has greatly enlarged the
category of potentially unlawful corporate and insider conduct by means of
a broad "reasonable man" standard while at the same time greatly limiting the
predictability of the outcome of 10b-5 actions by making factual considerations
controlling. Furthermore, the difficulties to be encountered by the courts in
ascertaining materiality under the standard are arguably small in comparison
with the problem presented to corporate officials who may no longer rely on
their own personal notions of what constitutes deceptive information.
71. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 186 N.E. 659 (1933).
72. Cary, CorporateStandardsand Legal Rides, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 408, 416 (1962).
73. List v. Fashion Park, 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. '1964). See Ruder, supra note 22 at
887 (Professor Ruder saw the district court's fixing of April 9 as the date when the information became material as a reflection of "the court's desire to eliminate liability for certain
defendants rather than its firm judgment as to the time at which the facts actually became
material." He looked on the opinion as an "exercise in judicial discretion" undertaken for
the protection of those defendants whose conduct was not deliberate.).
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As the dissenting opinion correctly points out, however, the nondisclosure
of corporate information has not previously given rise to liability under rule
10b-5 unless the defendant has engaged in a securities transaction or has actively
induced the injured party to buy or sell. On the basis of precedent, therefore,
one might argue that the company ought not to be reprimanded for the issuance
of the press release absent some corporate purpose to benefit directly from subsequent market activity. On the other hand, as Judge Friendly observes in his
concurring opinion, the fact that one of the more significant purposes of the
federal securities legislation was the prevention of the circulation of improper
information by the issuer itself should be sufficient to permit the SEC to deal
with corporate statements which, like those in the instant case, carry so much
potential for harm 4 Again, as in the case of insider conduct, the Commission
is not seeking to compel the company to disclose information which for legitimate business reasons was to be kept secret. Rather, the administrative purpose
seems to be only that management use reasonable care in drafting future releases. The exercise of due diligence under the circumstances by insiders and
issuers, therefore, will provide some protection although it seems clear that in
the market, as in corporate dealings generally, the business judgment rule will
not preclude liability where negligence is clearly establishedZ 5
Moreover, it seems unlikely that the federal courts will retreat from this
position to require a higher degree of fault under 10b-5 in view of the liberal
interpretation given by the Supreme Court to the federal securities laws in
general 70 By analogy to the language in section 206(2) of the Investment
Advisors Act 77 failure to establish an intent to deceive and the lack of good
faith should not prevent liability from arising under rule 10b-5 at least in proceedings brought by the Commission. In considering section 206, Justice Goldberg cautioned that the 1940 Act was to be construed "like other securities
legislation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds,' not technically and
restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes. 78 In situations
involving nondisclosure, the defendant's intent should not be material, said
Justice Goldberg, because ...
it is the practice itself. . . with its potential for abuse, which 'operates as a fraud or deceit' within the meaning of the Act when relevant information is suppressed. . . Failure to disclose material facts
must be deemed fraud or deceit within its intended meaning, for, as
the experience of the 1920's and 1930's amply reveals, the darkness
are the conditions upon which
and ignorance of commercial secrecy
79
predatory practices best thrive.
74. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968).
75. Id. 863.
76. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
77. Investment Advisors Act of 1940 § 206(2), 54 Stat. 852 (1940), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (1964).
78. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc. 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
79. Id. at 200. Cf. SEC v. Van Horn which construes the language of section 17 of
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With Justice Goldberg's remarks in mind, therefore, the Court of Appeals'
holding in the instant case seems proper (despite the closeness of the decision
as to the company in terms of factual considerations) when viewed in the light
of the Commission's broad obligation to seek out any fraudulent practice which
would impair the maintenance of fair and honest markets. And, even if the
courts were to limit civil liability for damages under the'rule to conduct which
falls just short of the activities in the instant case, the deterrent purposes of
actions brought by the SEC under section 10(b) more than justify the reasoning
of the majority in an area where an ounce of prevention is truly worth a pound
of cure.
GERALD TONER

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-1866 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT HELD CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE THIRTEENTH AM:ENDMENT

The Alfred H. Mayer Company refused to sell a new home to Joseph Lee
Jones solely because Jones was a Negro. The home was constructed as part of
the Paddock Woods housing development near St. Louis, Missouri, a housing
development that will ultimately be a suburban community of approximately
one thousand people. Because he was denied the right to purchase the property
solely on the basis of his race, Jones brought an action in a federal district
court against the developers for damages and injunctive relief. He based his
complaint upon 42 U.S.C. section 1982, asserting that this provision prohibits
private discrimination in the sale of real property.1 Alternatively, he argued
that defendant's action violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
2
amendment since the state was actively involved in the housing development.
The defendants moved for a dismissal on the grounds that 42 U.S.C. section
1982 was enacted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, and therefore is applicable only where there is action by the state; and that the facts alleged did
not constitute such state action. The district court, holding for the defendants,
the 1933 Act as to not require proof of scienter in an action under that section, 371 F.2d
181, 185 (7th Cir. 1966).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1965) provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property.
Plaintiffs also claimed that defendants violated other federal statutes, acts, and orders, but
these claims were not determinative in the final disposition of the case.
2. The defendants, acting in corporate form, were licensed by the state and were
protected by state zoning, banking, and lending laws. Approval by a county building
commissioner was required, and other state and county regulations and services were involved. Also, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants themselves fell under the meaning
of the equal protection clause since they exercised the power of municipal government by
providing and maintaining streets, recreation facilities, garbage collection, and other such
services.

